Maryland Law Review
Volume 52 | Issue 2

Article 8

Federal Impeachment and Criminal Procedure: the
Framers' Intent
Buckner F. Melton Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Buckner F. Melton Jr., Federal Impeachment and Criminal Procedure: the Framers' Intent, 52 Md. L. Rev. 437 (1993)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
THE FRAMERS' INTENT
BUCKNER

F.

MELTON, JR.*

On April 17, 1936, the United States Senate voted on whether
to convict federal district judge Halsted L. Ritter on seven articles of
impeachment.' The first six articles alleged a variety of offenses
ranging from bribery to champerty.2 The seventh, an omnibus article, contained no new factual material. 3 It charged that Ritter, by
his actions alleged in the first six articles, had brought himself, his
court, and the federal judiciary into disrepute, and that the Senate
should thus remove him from the bench. 4
Although the Senate acquitted Ritter on articles one through
six, it convicted him on the omnibus article by a bare two-thirds majority-the constitutional requirement for his removal.5 Ritter had
earlier objected to the seventh article on the grounds that it merely
repeated the preceding allegations. 6 Now he had further grounds
for objection; the Senate had acquitted him on the first six articles,
and then proceeded to convict him of an offense based on the same
factual allegations. Ritter filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that the Senate had violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition on double
7
jeopardy.

Ritter's lawsuit inaugurated a new era in the history of federal
impeachment. Never before had the subject of a federal impeach* Assistant Professor of History, Elon College; B.A., Mercer University, 1984;
M.A., Duke University, 1986; Ph. D., Duke University, 1990. I am grateful to Stuart
Basefsky, Clark R. Cahow, Irving B. Holley, Johannah Sherrer, and the staffs of the Government Documents and Reference Departments of Perkins Library, Duke University.
1. Impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter, 80 CONG. REC. 5602-08 (1936) [hereinafter
Ritter Proceedings]. See also Proceedings of U.S. Senate in Trial of Impeachment of Halsted L.
Ritter, S. Doc. No. 200, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 627-39 (1936), reported in U.S. Congressional Serial Set, No. 10006, at 627-68 (1936).
2. Ritter Proceedings, 80 CONG. REC. at 5602-08.
3. Id. at 5606.
4. Id.
5. The vote was 56-28, with 12 senators absent or excused. Id. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 3, cl. 6 ("[N]o Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of
the Members present.").
6. See Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 294 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668
(1937).
7. Petition at 63, Ritter (No. 43333). The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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ment sought judicial review of the process. 8 Since Ritter's case,
however, impeachment defendants consistently have attempted ju-

dicial redress at some point during or after the impeachment proceedings. 9 Although these individuals have sought different
remedies and challenged the Senate on a variety of grounds, one
common element clearly runs through all of the cases. Every impeachment defendant has either expressly or impliedly asserted that
he was entitled to due process or other criminal procedural rights,
and that Senate actions denied him those rights.' ° Still, however,
the debate continues, for no court has authoritatively stated the degree to which Bill of Rights criminal procedural guarantees apply to
impeachment.1 1

8. See Ritter, 84 Ct. Cl. at 297 (noting that "the question now being considered has
never been presented to a Federal Court in relation to the impeachment of a Federal
officer").
9. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993); Hastings v. United States
Senate, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (unpublished disposition).
10. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum and Opposition to Defendant's Motion
forJudgment on the Pleadings or for SummaryJudgment at 7-8, Nixon v. United States,
744 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990) (No. 89-3154-LFO) (appealing to notions of fairness),
aff'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 34-36, Hastings v. United States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38
(D.D.C.) (No. 89-1602) (challenging Senate action on fundamental fairness and due process grounds, and arguing that an impeachment defendant is entitled to sufficient funding to obtain the effective assistance of counsel), aff'd, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
reprinted in Proceedingsof U.S. Senate in Impeachment Trial of Alcee L. Hastings, S. Doc. No. 18,

101st Cong., 1st Sess. 868-70 (1989), reported in U.S. Congressional Serial Set, No.
13916, at 868-70 (1991) [hereinafter Hastings Proceedings]; Brief of Appellant at 45-48,
Hastings v. United States Senate, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (No. 89-5188) (maintaining that the double jeopardy prohibition barred his impeachment trial, and that the
lengthy delay before the presentation of articles of impeachment violated the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause), reprinted in Hastings Proceedings, supra, at 1026-29; Re-

ply Brief of Appellant at 14, Nixon v. United States Senate, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (No. 89-5191) (seeking not to enforce every requirement of modern criminal due
process, but rather "only... the constitutional requirement that the decision-makers in
the impeachment case actually hear and see the witnesses"), reprinted in Hastings Proceedings, supra, at 1236; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7-8, Claiborne v.
United States Senate, No. 86-2780 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 1986) (arguing that the Senate's action constituted a due process violation, a deprivation of the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and a denial of the right to confront one's
accusers), reprinted in Proceedingsof U.S. Senate in Impeachment Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, S.

Doc. No. 48, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/3:99-48,
at 170-71 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office) [hereinafter Claiborne Proceedings].
11. See, e.g., Hastings, 716 F. Supp. at 41 ("While some process is clearly due [the
impeachment defendant], rights are not necessarily compromised by varying from the
rights and process accorded defendants in criminal proceedings." (emphasis added)).
See also Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 504 (D.D.C. 1992) ("There is no
reason to believe that the full panoply of due process protections that apply to a trial by
an Article III court necessarily apply to every [impeachment] proceeding .... However,
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The central issue involved in these debates-whether impeachment is a criminal process-is actually an old one. Throughout impeachment's history-both in England and the United Stateslawyers, politicians, and scholars have debated this question.' 2 Generally the debate has focused on whether the process will lie for
nonindictable offenses, or indictable crimes only.'" Related questions deal with the nature of the penalty that the convicted defendant receives.' 4 The applicability of the criminal protections of the

they must be conducted in keeping with the basic principles of due process that have
been enunciated by the courts and, ironically, by the Congress itself.").
Although no court has authoritatively stated the extent to which these protections
apply to impeachment, the Supreme Court has determined that Senate impeachment
proceedings ordinarily are not subject to judicial review. In Nixon v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 732 (1993), the Court ruled that whether the Senate properly tried an impeachment was a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 740. Implicit in this ruling is the
Court's belief that criminal procedural guarantees do not apply to impeachment. See
discussion infra note 117.

12. For a sampling of scholarly discussion of the criminal process issue, see RAOUL
BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 78-85 (1973); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 258-61 (1783); PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL,
IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805 (1984); COLIN G.C. TiTE, IMPEACHMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY JUDICATURE IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND 1 (1974); Wrisley Brown, The Impeachment of the FederalJudiciary, 26 HARV. L. REV. 684 (1913); Theodore W. Dwight, Trial
by Impeachment, 6 AM. L. REG. (N.S.) 257 (1867) (may also be cited as 15 AM. L. REG. 257
(1867)); George H. Ethridge, The Law of Impeachment, 8 Miss. L.J. 283 (1936); Edwin B.
Firmage, The Law of PresidentialImpeachment, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 681, 684-87; Philip B.
Kurland, Watergate, Impeachment, and the Constitution, 45 Miss. L.J. 531 (1974); William
Lawrence, The Law of Impeachment, 6 AM. L. REG. (N.S.) 641 (1867) (may also be cited as
15 AM. L. REG. 641 (1867)); Clayton Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A
Reply to Raoul Berger, 84 YALE LJ. 1419 (1975); E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young,
Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachmentfor High Crimes and Misdemeanors
Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025, 1028, 1040 (1975).
13. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 259-60 ("[A]n impeachment.., is a prosecution of the already known and established law .... [A] peer may be impeached for any
crime."). Though BERGER, supra note 12, at 7-52, suggests that impeachment in Stuart
England was not limited to indictable offenses, other commentators have vigorously disagreed. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 1439; Dwight, supra note 12, at 269 ("[U]nless the
crime is specifically named in the constitution, impeachments like indictments can only
be instituted for crimes committed against the statutory law of the United States."). But
see Lawrence, supra note 12, at 658-65 (arguing that impeachment is not confined to
indictable offenses); Kurland, supra note 12, at 535-59 (rejecting the view that impeachment should be treated as a mere trial for criminal conduct); Brown, supra note 12, at
689-92 (concluding that impeachment may be had not only for violation of criminal
laws, but also for "an official dereliction of commission or omission, a serious breach of
moral obligation, or other gross impropriety of personal conduct which, in it natural
consequences, tends to bring an office into contempt and disrepute").
14. See Kurland, supra note 12, at 565-81 (discussing the nature of the sanctions available in a criminal proceeding); Firmage, supra note 12, at 698-704 (concluding that impeachment is a political rather than criminal process, concerned more with protecting
government than with punishment and retribution); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 655
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Bill of Rights is yet another dimension of this debate, 1 5 one that
6
parties have focused upon during their struggles in federal courts. '
Recent litigants have gone to great lengths to justify their respective positions on this issue, examining the text of the Constitution and the Framers' intent. Likewise, a number of judicial
opinions have included discussions of original intent in an attempt
17
to define the full scope of the Senate's powers and its limitations.
One judge, for instance, remarked in a 1986 case that the Framers
meant to separate impeachment from both civil and criminal
processes.' 8 He then, however, acknowledged that "[s]cholars have
said that the Due Process Clause applies even to the impeachment
power."' 9
Despite judges' increasing tendency to apply at least some degree of due process to impeachment proceedings-and despite their
efforts to discern the Framers' intent-they have failed to recognize
accounts of an early episode of crucial importance to this continuing
controversy. Almost completely forgotten today is an extended debate that took place on the floor of the United States Senate in February 1798. In this debate, the Senate authoritatively decided the
very issue that has plagued Congress, the courts, and impeachment
defendants since 1936.
The debate took place in the Fifth Congress during the impeachment of Senator William Blount-the first impeachment to
take place under the new Constitution.2 0 Several members of the
Constitutional Convention were directly involved, both as senators
(suggesting that "[t]he purposes of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of
the statute or the customary law").
15. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12, at 81-84 (discussing the right of trial by jury in
the impeachment of William Blount); Ethridge, supra note 12, at 294 (suggesting that the
rule against double jeopardy applies to impeachment).
16. See, e.g., Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 500, 504-05 (D.D.C. 1992)
(discussing the applicability of the Sixth Amendment criminal protections and Fifth
Amendment Due Process procedures to impeachment proceedings); Hastings v. United
States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38, 41 (D.D.C.) (holding that double jeopardy did not bar
impeachment), aff'd, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
17. See, e.g., Hastings, 802 F. Supp. at 503 (discussing the scope of the Senate's
power); Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 242-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discussing the
Framers' intent and the Senate's power), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
18. See Claiborne Proceedings, supra note 10, at 192 (incorporating the trial court
transcript).
19. Id. at 192-93 (quoting from the trial court transcript). See also Hastings v. United
States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38, 41 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
20. See UNIVERSAL GAZETrE, Mar. 29, 1798, at 4, col. 4. See generally WILLIAM H. MASTERSON, WILLIAM BLOUNT (1954); HOFFER & HILL supra note 12, at 151-63.
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and commentators. 2 Other participants included senators who had
served in the First Congress, which approved the Bill of Rights in its
final form. 2" Thus, this debate provides an accurate account of the
Framers' original intent regarding the role of the Bill of Rights's
criminal procedural guarantees in the impeachment process.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE IMPEACHMENT
OF WILLIAM BLOUNT

The last decade of the Eighteenth Century was an eventful period in American history. The infant national government was beginning to develop as the country became accustomed to its new
Constitution. By the late 1790s, the politically dominant Federalist
Party had done much to transform this relatively new document into
a working system of government, spawning major debates as theoretical constitutional issues became concrete political problems.2"
Generally, the Federalist Party was broad constructionist in outlook, working constantly to increase the vitality of the new government.2 4 In matters of foreign policy, the Federalists were
sympathetic toward Great Britain in that country's struggle against
revolutionary France.2 5 The party drew most of its support from the
eastern seaboard; farther inland lay the stronghold of the Republican Party.2 6
The Republicans of the 1790s tended to be strict constructionists, distrusting the power of the central government because,
21. Compare DAVID G. SMITH, THE CONVENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 93-94 (1987)
(listing the delegates at the Constitutional Convention) with 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 508
(1798) (listing the senators who were involved in the Blount debate).
22. Compare KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1789-1989, at 70 (1989) (listing the members of The First
Congress) with 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 508 (1798) (listing the senators involved in the
Blount debate).
23. SeeJOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801, at 56-57 (1960) (discussing
the constitutional controversy surrounding the Bank of the United States, and the positions of Andrew Hamilton, a leading Federalist, and James Madison, a leading Republican); id. at 65-67 (discussing the Tariff Act of May 1792, which provided government aid
to manufacturers); id. at 231-34 (discussing the Sedition Act of 1798).
24. See id. at 109-10.
25. See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE NEW REPUBLIC, 17761815, at 42-78 (1985) (discussing the disagreement among American leaders regarding
foreign policy objectives in 1789); MILLER, supra note 23, at 142-43.
26. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 100 ("In general, Federalism was weakest in the
West, strongest in the cities ....
and firmly established among the prosperous farmers
and planters of the eastern seaboard." (citation omitted)); see also MARTIS, supra note 22,
at 70-75 (containing maps illustrating the party affiliations of congressional representatives by district).
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among other things, their political enemies controlled it. 2 7 Opposed to the monopolizing spirit of commerce, Republicans "spoke
in the name of American agriculture."12 ' Republicans also differed
with Federalists in foreign matters, favoring France over England. 9
This partisan difference in foreign policy outlook was no mere
theoretical contest. While large-scale American involvement overseas still lay generations in the future, the great powers of Europe
were heavily involved in the New World.3 0 Among other places
where one might encounter the forces of Britain, France, or
France's ally Spain, was the American frontier.3 And in the 1790s
the United States reached inland only as far as the Mississippi
River.3 2 Across the Mississippi, sweeping from the Gulf of Mexico
northwestward to the Rocky Mountains, lay the Spanish territory of
Louisiana.3 3
This Spanish presence-and the accompanying and constant
threat of a French acquisition of the territory-worried many Americans. 34 With the advent of war between Britain and Spain in October of 1796, many feared that France would demand Louisiana from
Spain in return for its alliance. 3 5 Especially concerned were the
frontiersmen and land speculators of the West who depended upon
the Mississippi for transportation and land sales to settlers for income.3 6 The prospect of powerful France exerting control over the
Louisiana Territory and the Mississippi River would surely diminish
the value of the speculators' investments.3 7
27. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 102-04. A classic illustration of the Republican
strict-constructionist position is Jefferson's debate with Hamilton on the Bank of the
United States. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 78-80 (12th ed. 1991); see
generally Lance Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to
1793, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 167 (3d Series 1974).
28. MILLER, supra note 23, at 105.
29. See id. at 126-27, 142-43.
30. See HORSMAN, supra note 25, at 41; MILLER, supra note 23, at 185.
31. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 185.
32. Id.
33. See HORSMAN, supra note 25, at 86-87.
34. See id. at 88-89.
35. MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 301-02.
36. HORSMAN, supra note 25, at 88-89.
37. MILLER, supra note 23, at 190. See also Letter from Nicholas Romayne to William
Blount (Mar. 17, 1797), in FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES 214
(Burt Franklin 1970) (1849) ("I readily see that, as the French are a military and not a
commercial people, that if they do get possession, they will oblige the western people to
come into all their measures and caprices, or they will shut up the navigation-they will
sow discord among the people, and the value of lands and all property will be greatly
reduced."); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2346 (1798) (reprinting the same letter but missing the
first 14 words of the above-quoted sentence).
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One concerned individual was a Tennessean named William
Blount."8 Blount first came to national prominence while serving in
the Continental Congress, and later in the Constitutional Convention.3 9 Through his connections, this leading southern land speculator won an appointment as Governor of the Southwest Territory
in 1790.40 A Federalist at first, Blount eventually came to reflect the
dominant political outlook of his region, joining the Republicans by
the mid-1790s. 4 t
By 1796, Blount and others believed that Tennessee, which
comprised a large part of the Southwest Territory, was ready for
statehood,4 2 and Congress agreed. 4 ' Blount, arguably the leading
political figure in the region, became one of the first two United
44
States senators from the new state.
Economic conditions on the frontier and Blount's own finances,
however, were to be the new Senator's downfall. Blount had invested every personal resource to purchase large tracts of land in
the western United States with the hope that he could realize significant income from its sale to settlers. 45 Financially overextended,
Blount could not afford to see his investments fail. Therefore, in an
effort to end the foreign threat to the West-and to his land holdings-the Senator decided to raise an army of frontiersmen to liberate Spanish-controlled Louisiana.4 6 To this end, Blount, in great
secrecy and through intermediaries, approached the English authorities and requested both money and material assistance.4 7 Blount
hoped that as a result of his plan, England would win New World
territory, 48 frontiersmen would gain assurance of free trade and ac38. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 190. Blount was described as ".. . an original. An
early version of the wheeling and dealing, land speculating, sharp-nosed manipulator,
politician, and financier, he knew how to get what he wanted-and usually by the shortest route." ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREWJACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE,
1767-1821, at 51 (1977).
39. See MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 110-33.
40. See id. at 174-79.
41. See id. at 297-98.
42. See id. at 282-84.
43. Tennessee was admitted into the Union on June 1, 1796. See ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491
(1796).
44. MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 292-96.
45. Id. at 298-99. Blount was "utterly and irretrievably committed to a realization on
his land interests with no alternative save absolute ruin." Id. at 299.
46. Id. at 303-08; MILLER, supra note 23, at 190.
47. See MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 307-10; MILLER, supra note 23, at 190.
48. MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 307. In exchange for England's assistance, Blount
planned to let it take control of Louisiana, and to grant it access to the Mississippi. Id.
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cess to the interior,4 9 and Blount himself would secure new settlers
50
and purchasers for his vast tracts of realty.
Blount's nebulous dream turned to ashes, however, when an incriminating letter from him to one of his compatriots fell into government hands in April 1797. 5 l Walking into the Senate chamber
on July third, Blount had the shock of hearing the clerk read the
letter aloud.5 2 The senators, outraged that one of their colleagues
would plan such foreign exploits, expelled him within a week. 5 3 The
House of Representatives, whose members were equally incensed,
impeached Blount even before his expulsion.5 4 Thus, the first federal impeachment came to fruition.
The Blount impeachment continued for eighteen months
before its final resolution.5 5 Like many other issues of the day, the
impeachment was an occasion for intense discussion about the concrete application of new, untried constitutional provisions. The debate that took place in February 1798 was just one of many, but in
light of recent developments in late twentieth-century impeachment
jurisprudence, it was a debate of particular importance.

49. See supra note 37.
50. See MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 304-05.
51. See id. at 315-17.
52. Id. at 316. See also Letter from William Blount to James Carey (Apr. 21, 1797), in
WHARTON, supra note 37, at 216-17. Blount must have been very surprised, considering
that he had instructed the letter's recipient, James Carey, to "read this letter over three
times, [and] then burn it." Id. at 217. See also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2349-50 (1798) (reprinting the same letter).
53. MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 321-22; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 12, at 151
("His grandiose plotting, encompassing a cabal of adventurers, a small private army, two
Indian tribes, Spain, and Great Britain, was so distasteful to his fellow senators that they
expelled him after a mere two days' debate."). Both the House of Representatives and
the Senate have the power to expel their respective members. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
cl. 2.
54. See MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 321. By impeaching the Senator, the House
obviously wished Blount to suffer the additional penalty of disqualification from holding
any future federal office if the Senate proceeded to convict him. See HOFFER & HULL,
supra note 12, at 151, 156-57, 162.
It was not until January 1798, eight months after Blount's impeachment by the
House, that the House approved actual articles of impeachment. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG.
948-51 (1798). This seemingly backwards process further supports my argument that
the Framers favored procedural laxity in the impeachment context.
55. Impeachment charges were entered against Blount on July 7, 1797, see MASTERSON, supra note 20, at 321, and on January 11, 1799, the Senate dismissed the impeachment for want ofjurisdiction. Id. at 342. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2318-19 (1799).
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THE DEBATE

In early 1798, some members of Congress had been mentioning, informally, the possibility that the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury trial in criminal prosecutions extended to
impeachment trials.5 6 One such member was Senator Henry Tazewell, a celebrated attorney, former judge, and probably the most
popular Virginian of his time.
A staunch Republican, Tazewell
was a firm believer in strict construction and an opponent of strong
central government. 5s Previously one of the foremost judicial officers in Virginia, he was very familiar with his state's constitution, in
which impeachment had a decidedly judicial character, requiring the
use of juries.5 9
Tazewell enjoyed the friendship and high regard of Vice President Thomas Jefferson, the nation's leading Republican. 60 Jefferson, as presiding officer of the Senate, was hesitant to become
involved openly in the Blount impeachment. 6 ' He did, however, on
at least one occasion confidentially volunteer the results of his own
private impeachment research to Tazewell. 6 2 The great English
commentators William Blackstone and Richard Wooddeson, Jefferson told his fellow Virginian, held impeachment to be a criminal
prosecution.6 3 This fact, together with the Constitution's phrase
56. Vice President Thomas Jefferson had mentioned the issue as early as late January
in a private letter to James Madison in which he even ventured to give Madison an estimate of Senate support for the use of juries. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Jan. 25, 1798), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 192-93 (Paul L. Ford
ed., 1896) [hereinafterJEFFERSON WRITINGS]. The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A full reading of the Amendment
reveals the fundamental problem of determining the geographical parameters of an impeachment jury pool.
57. See 18 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 354 (Dumas Malone ed. 1964).
58. 18 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 57, at 354.
59. Tazewell served on the committee that framed Virginia's state constitution. Id.
See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 12, at 70-75 (outlining Virginia's original impeachment
process); infra text accompanying note 97.
60. 18 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 57, at 354.
61. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Tazewell (Jan. 27, 1798) in 7JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 195.
62. See id. at 194-95. Jefferson cautioned: "[d]o not let the inclosed paper be seen in
my handwriting." Id. at 195. The enclosed paper contained Jefferson's research results
regarding the impeachment issue, including a long list of legal authority. See JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS: "PARLIAMENTARY POCKET-BOOK" AND A MANUAL OF
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 11-12 (Wilbur S. Howell ed., 1988) [hereinafter JEFFERSON'S
PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS].

63. Letter from Jefferson to Tazewell, supra note 61, at 194.
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"high Crimes and Misdemeanors," was more than enough to convince the Vice President that the Constitution required a jury in the
Blount impeachment. 64 It was probably a combination of Jefferson's research results and Tazewell's familiarity with Virginia impeachment process that led Tazewell to introduce a surprising
resolution before the Senate on February 14, 1798.
On that day, while the Senate discussed a pending bill regarding proper impeachment trial procedures, the Virginia Senator
moved that the chamber call a jury to hear the case. 6 5 The motion
produced a combination of amazement and contempt. Jacob Read,
an outspoken Federalist senator, demanded that Tazewell elaborate
upon his "extraordinary proposition." 6 6 Read sarcastically insisted
that he wished to hear all that Tazewell could say to prove that
"such a monster" as a jury of twelve and a court of thirty-two (the
senators) belonged within the Senate's walls. Republican Timothy
Bloodworth sprang to Tazewell's defense, replying that not everyone was as anxious as Read to dismiss the issue without mature deliberation.6 7 Senator Elijah Paine, however, reiterated Read's
comments, challenging Tazewell to prove the need for a jury.6" After this posturing, the Senate decided to delay debate on the mo6
tion. On February 16, Tazewell again brought up his proposal, 1
and the Senate addressed for the first time an issue that has undergone debate in scholarly circles ever since-whether impeachment
is a criminal process.
Tazewell was the first of several men to speak on that day, and
he was well-equipped for battle. At the outset, he acknowledged
that some senators would be prejudiced against him based on their
own state constitutions or his resort to English precedent, which was
necessary to prove his case. He then decried the passions that drove
men-by whom he meant the Federalists-to increase, rather than
restrain, their power. Having made those preliminary observations,
Tazewell proceeded to deliver a lengthy argument that marked him
64. See id; see also JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS, supra note 62, at 12 (referencing a letter from Jefferson to Federalist Senator Samuel Livermore, a member of the
impeachment committee, suggesting that the committee use his notes for guidance). See
generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
65. The substance of the debate on this aspect of the Blount impeachment can be
found in a series of newspaper articles. See AURORA, Feb. 16, 20, & 28, 1798; UNIVERSAL
GAZETrE, Mar. 1 & 29, 1798.
66. AURORA, Feb. 16, 1798, at 2, col. 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. UNIVERSAL GAZETrE, Mar. 1, 1798, at 4, col. 1.
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as perhaps the most innovative and logical rhetorician involved in
the Blount case.
The original Constitution, Tazewell observed, contained two
pertinent phrases. The first was the provision that granted the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments. 70 The second was a passage in Article III, Section 2 requiring a jury in the trials of all
crimes, with the exception of impeachment cases. 7' Under the unamended Constitution, Tazewell conceded, the impeachment process did not require the use of juries. The Sixth Amendment,
however, stipulated that all criminal trials involve juries, making no
express exception for impeachment as had Article III. Therefore,
the entire issue rested on two questions: (1) was impeachment a
criminal prosecution, and (2) if so, did the Sixth Amendment abrogate the Article III provision? If the answer to both of these questions was "yes," then the Constitution-specifically, the Sixth
Amendment-required that the Senate summon a jury. If the answer to either question was "no," a jury would not be necessary.
Tazewell turned first to the question of impeachment's criminal
nature, reciting argument after argument to prove that impeachment was a criminal prosecution. Appealing to constitutional terminology, the Senator stressed phrases such as "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors," the constitutional standard for impeachable offenses, and the express exception of impeachments from the Article
III provision requiring a jury in all criminal trials. This exception,
he stated forcefully, revealed that the Framers considered impeachment to be criminal, for otherwise an exception would have been
unnecessary. 7 2 Appealing to English law, he reeled off a string of
citations from Blackstone and Wooddeson that must have made Jefferson smile with satisfaction. Then Tazewell resorted to analogy,
attempting to show that impeachment bore a number of similarities
to indictment. Each process, Tazewell maintained, had as its object
the punishment of a defendant; often both processes would reach
the same sorts of offenses. He explained that an impeachment tried
before a regular court would possess every essential element of an
indictment. Because impeachments and indictments were proce70. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments.").
71. UNIVERSAL GAZErrE, Mar. 1, 1798, at 4, col. 1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3
("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the
Congress may by Law have directed.").
72. UNIVERSAL GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 1798, at 4, col. 1.
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durally indistinguishable, the Senator concluded that the former
must be criminal in nature, for the place of trial had no effect upon
that nature. Finally Tazewell discounted the possibility that impeachment was sui generis, a unique procedure, arguing that only two
types of process existed, namely, the civil and the criminal. Impeachment was clearly not civil, and if it were sui generis, he continued, then it was a dangerous device, not subject to any legal
control." He expressed a strong hope that the Senate "would this
day not create such a monster, but confine impeachments to that
74
class of prosecutions which alone could restain [sic] its ferocity."Having concluded that impeachments were criminal prosecutions, Tazewell endeavored to show that the Sixth Amendment
clause modified the original Constitution, extending the jury trial
requirement to all criminal prosecutions, including impeachment.
Tazewell's primary attack consisted of an analysis of both the Constitution's language and the Framers' intent. He began this attack
by observing that the Sixth Amendment contained no impeachment
exception. This alone would seem to overrule the original Article
III provision, but Tazewell went further. He argued that other than
the impeachment exception, no difference existed between the two
clauses. A fundamental maxim of legal interpretation, Tazewell informed his audience, was that no clause of a document should be
considered meaningless; and yet if the Sixth Amendment was construed such that it did not modify the original clause and extend
juries to impeachments, the amendment served no purpose at all.75
Turning to the drafters' intent, Tazewell noted that the Sixth
Amendment provision, as first proposed by James Madison, did contain the impeachment exception, but that a Senate committee had
subsequently removed it. Ignoring the inconsistency between this
argument and the immediately preceding one, Tazewell urged that
this deletion of an express exception constituted a denial of an exception, and that impeachments therefore required juries. Tazewell
then reminded the Senate of the case of Jay's Treaty, in which the
House of Representatives, attempting to involve itself in treaty concerns with Great Britain, sought papers on Secretary of State John
Jay's negotiations from President Washington's administration. 76
73. Id. This sentiment lay at the heart of Republican objections to the Federalist
goal of a broad impeachment power. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
74. UNIVERSAL GAZE-rrE, Mar. 1, 1798, at 4, col. 2 (clearly meaning "restrain").
75. Id.
76. Id. For a discussion of the events surrounding Jay's Treaty, see MILLER, supra

note 23, at 164-79.
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Some senators now opposing Tazewell's motion had opposed the
House on that occasion, Tazewell reminded his fellow congressmen.
In that instance, Washington had noted that the Framers in 1787
first approved, and then deleted, a constitutional clause that would
have given the House the power to obtain Jay's papers. Washington
interpreted this to mean that the House did not have the power, and
he thus refused to comply with the representatives' request. Tazewell's message was obvious: The Federalist senators who approved
Washington's actions in 1796 should now be consistent and adhere
to the rule of construction that Washington had then invoked.7 7
The Virginia Senator then moved on to argue from more general principles, such as the need to guarantee impartiality. A jury,
he proclaimed, was "the best shield against judicial oppression,"
and an impeachment defendant, with his reputation and office at
stake, should have the benefit of such protection.78
Lastly, Tazewell confronted two arguments that were circulating within the Senate. First, some had suggested that state practice
did not support the use of juries because certain states with constitutional language similar to the original Article III provision failed
to use juries in impeachments. Tazewell replied that this argument
ignored the effect of the Sixth Amendment, and further, that the
Senate should afford equal consideration to those states that did use
juries in impeachments. Second, he dismissed as insufficient the
suggestion that the use of a jury would prove inconvenient. 79 Ruling authorities, he said, would always find it inconvenient to share
their power with other groups.8 0 Inconvenience, he declared, could
not bar the exercise of a constitutional right.
As Tazewell concluded his discourse, a number of Republicans
immediately requested a postponement in order to consider the
Senator's arguments. This motion itself blossomed into a major issue. All Republicans who spoke, together with Federalist
Humphrey Marshall (a strict-constructionist), either sought a postponement, or demanded a Federalist answer to Tazewell's speech,
or both.8" The Federalists were torn. Though all who spoke
claimed to have made up their minds, some wished to have an op77. See UNIVERSAL GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 1798, at 4, col. 2; see also MILLER, supra note 23,
at 171-74 (discussing Washington's method of constitutional interpretation in the case
of Jay's Treaty).
78. UNIVERSAL GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 1798, at 4, col. 3.
79. Id. (declaring that Tazewell "could not believe that a constitutional right ought
to be taken away on account of the inconveniencies which might attend its existence").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 4, cols. 3-4.
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portunity to respond. Jacob Read was not one of the latter. He belligerently remarked that when Tazewell first brought up the jury
issue, Read had "really tho't it was for merriment. 8' 2 When he had
realized that Tazewell was sincere, he listened, but heard nothing to
change his mind.
Despite Read's outburst, those senators who desired to allow
time for a rebuttal prevailed. For these men the need for a reply
seemed a matter of honor. At least two of them denied Republican
charges that the Federalists had already secretly agreed to defeat
Tazewell's motion. 3 After the debate on postponement had run for
some time, James Ross, followed by Richard Stockton, rose to reply
to Tazewell. 4 The fact that either of these broad-constructionists
could prepare an answer so quickly is suspicious. Each speech,
moreover, seems curiously well thought out. The Federalists, their
denials notwithstanding, probably did decide beforehand to prepare
answers to Tazewell's argument.
In his argument, James Ross did almost exactly what Tazewell
had counseled the Senate to avoid. He distinguished impeachment
from regular civil and criminal processes, declaring it to be a unique
instrument.8 5 Ross delineated various types of Anglo-American
legal proceeding, mentioning trials at common law, trials in chancery, and trials in admiralty. He added to this list trials by impeachment. All of these, he stated, were substantively and procedurally
different from each other. Impeachment, then, was by no means the
only example of a process other than a civil or criminal common law
proceeding. Ross concluded that impeachment was not a criminal
prosecution, but instead a trial of a government officer for breach of
duty.8 6
Ross then asked the Senate to consider the result if an impeachment jury acquitted a defendant but two-thirds of the Senate voted
to convict.8 7 Not pausing to dwell on this point, he noted that impeachment defendants were liable to criminal prosecution in the
82. Id. at 4, col. 3.
83. Id. at 4, col. 3 (explaining how one Federalist insisted that "[h]e knew of nothing
to warrant the insinuation that a decision on this question had been made out of
doors").

84. See AURORA, Feb. 20, 1798, at 3, col. 1.
85. See AURORA, Feb. 28, 1798, at 2, col. 2.
86. Id.
87. Id. (questioning, "[I]f two thirds of the Senate agreed to the guilt of the accused,
were they to pass sentence tho' the jury had returned a verdict of not guilty; were they to
be deprived by the jury of the exclusive power given them by the constitution to try
impeachment?").
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regular courts, in addition to undergoing the impeachment process. 88 Ross believed that this fact alone indicated that impeachment was something other than a criminal action.8 9 Tazewell's
motion, Ross concluded, would also violate the Senate's authority
under the Sole Power Clause. 90
Richard Stockton's argument rested on different grounds. The
Sixth Amendment, he maintained, applied only to judicial matters. 9 1
Referring to the amendment's history in the First Congress, Stockton explained that it was adopted "merely as an explanatory amendment to quiet the minds of the people respecting the trial byjury. It
was only a kind of amplification on the ordinary judicial power provided by the original constitution. '"92 Stockton, however, viewed
impeachment as a legislative matter. Thus, the jury trial provision
in no way affected the Senate's sole power to try impeachments.
Stockton explained that any contrary understanding would permit
an implied interpretation of the Sixth Amendment to override an
express constitutional grant of power to the Senate.93
Now that Tazewell had heard his arguments answered, he
wished to make a reply. Once again he asked for a postponement in
order to compose a rebuttal.9 4 Read, impatient and still bellicose,
announced that he was prepared to stay in the chamber until mid95
night if it meant that the Senate could finish the business that day.
Notwithstanding the South Carolinian's attitude, the Republicans
managed to win a postponement until Monday, the nineteenth of
February.
On Monday, the first man to speak in the next long round of
discussion was Elijah Paine, a Federalist from Vermont.9 6 He, like
his two colleagues before him, emphasized the Senate's sole jurisdiction in impeachment trials, and categorized impeachments as a
political rather than a criminal process. He then examined the im88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
7 ("[T]he Party convicted [by impeachment] shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.").
89. AURORA, Feb. 28, 1798, at 2, col. 2. Ross inferred that "the trial by impeachment
was an extraordinary proceeding, not according to the ordinary courts of law, nor to
punish a transgression of the law; but to effect the removal of the offender from office."
Id.
90. See supra note 70.
91. AURORA, Feb. 28, 1798, at 2, col. 3.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2, col. 4.
95. Id.
96. See UNIVERSAL GAZETrE, Mar. 29, 1798, at 4, col. 1.
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peachment provisions of half a dozen state constitutions to show
how the citizens of these states viewed impeachments. Paine declared that only in Virginia, Tazewell's home state, did the state constitution expressly vest impeachment jurisdiction in the regular
court system, as a judicial process. Nowhere else in state practice,
he claimed, had juries ever found their way into impeachment
trials.07
Then Read rose yet again, but confined his comments to restatements of the anti-jury position and further observations about
the disgraceful nature of the entire issue. 98 When Read had finished, Tazewell began a lengthy rebuttal. First he attacked Ross's
conclusion that impeachment must not be criminal because of regular courts' concurrent jurisdiction.9 9 Tazewell drew exactly the opposite conclusion from the clause in question; because a civil action
could never bar a subsequent criminal proceeding, the Framers
would have had no need to approve concurrent jurisdiction expressly in Article I, Section 3 unless they held impeachment to be
criminal. Having thus endeavored once again to demonstrate impeachment's criminal nature, Tazewell returned to the second question of whether the Sixth Amendment modified the original jury
trial provision.
The Virginia Senator made reference to an earlier episode, in
which Ross and other broad constructionists had argued that the
Senate had an implied power to prescribe, by resolution, an oath for
itself to take before hearing the merits in an impeachment trial.
Strict constructionists had argued that the enactment of such an
oath was an exercise of legislative power, and therefore the approval
of both houses of Congress was required.' 0 0 In that instance, Tazewell said accusingly, the Federalists had not objected to overriding
the Congress's express power of legislation with an implied reading
of the Sole Power Clause that would let the Senate act unilaterally.
And yet, Tazewell continued, these same senators now denied that
the Sixth Amendment could likewise implicitly overrule the express
provision of Article III. The rule, Tazewell commented sarcastically, appeared to be that implied readings were acceptable only

97. Id.
98. Id. at 4, col. 2.
99. Id. See supra note 88.
100. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 503 (1798); AURORA, Feb. 10, 1798, at 2, cols. 2-3 (mistakenly describing a Senate debate of February 8 as having taken place on February 1);
AURORA, Feb. 11, 1798, at 2, cols. 3-5.
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where they served to increase the Senate's power.''
Regardless, he continued, implied constructions were unnecessary because the Sixth Amendment explicitly required the use ofjuries in all criminal prosecutions, and surely impeachment was such a
process. Answering Stockton's assertions, Tazewell even reconciled
the Sixth Amendment with the Sole Power Clause. The latter was a
grant ofjurisdiction, he explained, and just as a chancery court may
have exclusive jurisdiction in equity cases, and admiralty courts in
admiralty cases, the Senate has exclusive jurisdiction in impeachment. Thus, Tazewell observed, whether or not a chancery or admiralty court used a jury did not alter its grant of exclusive
jurisdiction.10 2 The same was true of the Senate's jurisdiction over
impeachments. Under this reading the two clauses did not conflict
at all. The Sole Power Clause was merely a grant of jurisdiction
rather than a carte blanche to the Senate over procedural matters that
other constitutional provisions covered.
Tazewell then proceeded to answer additional objections that
Ross, Paine, and Stockton had raised. First, he challenged Stockton's interpretation of the debates in the First Congress, stating that
he would not object to the extension of other Bill of Rights guarantees to impeachment as well.10 3 Second, he attacked Paine's citation
of precedent from several states. Finally, he addressed the danger
of a conflict between juries and senators, of which Ross had warned
earlier. Ajury vote of conviction, Tazewell argued, was alone never
sufficient to convict a defendant unless the court agreed. Hence the
use of a jury would not abrogate the clause requiring a vote of twothirds of the Senate in order to punish the party on trial."0 4
At long last, Tazewell concluded by saying that he had simply
attempted to show his fellow senators why he thought a jury would
be necessary in the Blount impeachment, and that the Senate was
the body to decide whether he had done so effectively. In fact his
analysis was brilliant. His arguments, moreover, had elicited Federalist responses that were no less impressive. What the Senate was
about to decide upon was not just the jury issue but the broad question of whether constitutional criminal procedure should be applied
to the impeachment process.
The chamber soundly defeated Tazewell's motion. 0 5 The de101. UNIVERSAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1798, at 4, col. 3.
102. Id. at 4, col. 4.
103. Id.
104. See UNIVERSAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1798, at 4, col. 5.
105. 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 508 (1798).
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feat, moreover, was accomplished by no mere partisan vote, for
Tazewell all along had been almost the only voice to speak in support of the jury concept. Even when his fellow Republicans had defended him, they were defending not so much his position as his
right to speak. Of the twenty-nine senators in the chamber, only
three voted to support the motion.'" 6 Two of these-Tazewell and
Stevens T. Mason-were the senators from Virginia, where state impeachment was clearly more judicial in character.' 0 7 The third man
was Blount's good friend and prot6g6, Andrew Jackson.' °8
CONCLUSION

The Senate vote against the use of juries in impeachments
could have rested on a failure of either of Tazewell's two arguments.
Either the senators believed that impeachment was not a criminal
process, or that it was a criminal process but that the Sixth Amendment provision did not nullify the Article III clause. If the vote
rested on the latter grounds, then it said nothing about other criminal provisions in the Bill of Rights. If, however, it rested on the
former reason, then the vote had far broader ramifications, logically
applying to the other criminal guarantees as well.'0 9 The Senate
expressed no formal reason, of course, for its decision. The majority of arguments presented by Tazewell's opponents, however, addressed the broader issue of impeachment's nature. This fact
suggests that the former issue, rather than a more routine rule of
construction, was the Senate's true concern.
The question of impeachment's criminal nature, additionally,
was a much more basic and complex issue in both theoretical and
practical terms than the second concern. The Sixth Amendment's
meaning was a relatively simple matter, a straightforward exercise in
construction. The wording of the amendment was absolute. By a
plain reading of its jury trial provision, ajury from the district where
the offense took place would unquestionably be necessary in im-

106. Id.
107. Id. See supra note 59.
108. 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 508 (1798). By 1792, Blount considered Jackson to be one

of his strongest supporters, "someone he could trust and rely on." REMINI, supra note
38, at 54. In turn, Blount worked actively to further Jackson's career. Id. Moreover,
Jackson was committed to Blount's entire conspiratorial design against the Spanish, and
he "stoutly defended his political mentor at every opportunity" throughout the course
of the impeachment. Id. at 105.
109. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. IV, V, & VI.
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peachment trials'l°0-if impeachment were a criminal process.
Surely the outpouring of strong feelings came about because of a
dispute deeper than a mere conflict in generally accepted theories of
interpretation, for Tazewell introduced no radically new maxims of
construction. Both the senators' comments, and their clearly expressed attitudes, indicate that the defeat of Tazewell's motion constituted a decision that impeachment was not a criminal process.
The day after Tazewell had submitted his jury proposal, Jefferson gloomily observed that the two-to-one Federalist majority in the
Senate would make short work of the measure."' In fact the Vice
President overestimated his party's support for the motion, as the
final vote revealed." 2 The heavy preponderance of opinion against
the use of a jury no doubt bothered Jefferson, who saw unchecked
'l
impeachments as instruments "more of passion than justice." " 3
Jefferson warned that impeachment would be a "formidable
weapon" in the hands of the Federalists, a "most effectual [method]
for getting rid of any man whom they consider as dangerous to their
views .... 'i14 Shortly after the final vote, Jefferson wrote to James
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing criminal defendants with the right to "an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
11. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 15, 1798), in 7JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 202.
112. Jefferson had predicted a vote of 22 to 10, id., but the final vote was 26 to 3. 7
ANNALS OF CONG. 508 (1798).

113. Letter from Jefferson to Madison, supra note 11, at 203.
114. Id. at 202. Within a few months, Jefferson's fears would come to fruition in a
different form. The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798), which Congress adopted in
July of 1798, prescribed heavy fines and imprisonment for those judged guilty of writing, publishing or speaking anything of a false, scandalous, and malicious nature against
the Federalist government. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 229-32. Shortly after the bill's
passage, Matthew Lyon, a Republican Congressman from Vermont, was indicted on the
charge of making libelous statements against President John Adams. Id. at 235-36.
Though Lyon was convicted, the charges only served to make him a Republican martyr:
he ran for re-election and won during his four-month term in prison. Id. at 236. See also
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 12, at 151 (noting the tension created by the co-existence of
the Sedition Act and the possibility that federal officers belonging to minority parties
may be impeached); id. at 156-57 (noting a Federalist theory that even private citizens
may be impeached).
Jefferson's concern over the use of impeachment as a political weapon has recently
resurfaced. In Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1992), federal district court judge Stanley Sporkin explained that if impeachments were completely unreviewable, "a political party which gained a majority of seats in the House and two-thirds
of the seats in the Senate could without any legitimate basis purge from the federal
bench those whose views were contrary to theirs. Insisting as they did on life tenure for
the judiciary, the founding fathers could not have shared these views." Id. at 495 n.5.
Jefferson's concern about an unchecked impeachment power is reflected in the
views of Justices White, Blackmun, and Souter of the present-day Supreme Court. In
Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993), a majority of the Supreme Court deter-
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Madison to tell him of the outcome." 5 Jefferson was probably surprised when Madison, the original author of the Sixth Amendment,
answered that6 Tazewell's jury arguments had left him
unconvinced. 1
Madison's statement was a final blow to the theory that criminal
provisions of the Bill of Rights necessarily applied to impeachment.
In fact, very few members of the Framers' generation were in favor
of the jury trial measure; most went on record as solidly against it.
The debate and decision upon this issue-a full discussion followed
by a lopsided, overwhelming vote against Tazewell's motionshould destroy any intent-based argument that impeachment is a
criminal process. The Framers' original intent, furthermore, contradicts the lower federal courts' recent tendency to apply some degree
of due process and other Bill of Rights guarantees to impeachment.' 7 Members of the 1787 Convention, members of the Conmined that Senate impeachment trial procedures are not subject to judicial review. Id. at
740. Whereas Jefferson was concerned with the lack of ajury check on the impeachment
power, Justices White and Souter wrote separately in Nixon to express their concern over
the lack of any judicial safeguard. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, warned
that an unreviewable discretion would allow the Senate to convict an impeachment defendant "without any procedure whatsoever." Id. at 741 (White, J., concurring). Likewise, Justice Souter envisioned situations justifying judicial interference. For instance,
he believed interference might be appropriate "[i]f the Senate were to act in a manner
seriously threatening the integrity of its results, [such as] convicting... upon a coin toss
.... Id. at 748 (Souter, J., concurring). For further discussion of the Nixon case, see
infra note 117.
115. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 22, 1798), in 7JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 207.
116. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 4, 1798), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON

88 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991). Madison observed that

"[m]y impression has always been that impeachments were somewhat sui generis, and
excluded the use of Juries." Id.
117. This recent trend suffered a major reversal in Nixon v. United States, 113 S.Ct.
732 (1993). In Nixon, the Supreme Court ruled that courts lack the power to review the
manner in which the Senate may "try" an impeachment proceeding. Id. at 740. The
Court believed that allowing the Senate final authority to determine impeachment trial
procedures would in no way transgress "identifiable textual limits" in the Constitution.
See id. Therefore, impeachment presented a political, nonjusticiable question to the
Court, precluding it from reviewing the propriety of the Senate's decision to "try" an
impeachment by appointing a committee of senators to hear evidence and report it to
the full Senate. See id. at 734.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the word "try"
"lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standards of review ...."
Id. at 736. According to the Court, the Constitution places three "very specific" restrictions on the Senate's impeachment power-the senators must be under oath, a twothirds vote is necessary to convict, and the Chief Justice must preside at the impeachment trial of a President. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that "these limitations are
quite precise, and their nature suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional
limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the word 'try'...." Id. (emphasis
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gress that framed the Bill of Rights, and the author of the original
amendments opposed without qualification the idea that impeachment was a criminal process subject to constitutional criminal
provisions.
The Senate, however, is free to decide that such provisions
should apply to impeachment, for each house of Congress determines its rules of proceedings.' l8 Senators could thus voluntarily
extend such rights to an impeachment defendant if they wished.
But this decision must be that of the Senate alone. Any judicial effort to overrule the Senate's decision on this point would go against
a compelling decision of the authors and ratifiers of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.

added). Implicit in this reasoning is the Court's decision that Bill of Rights criminal
procedural guarantees provide no additional limitations on the impeachment power.
The Nixon result is in full accordance with the defeat of Tazewell's jury trial measure
in the Blount impeachment. The Nixon court, however, missed an opportunity to use the
1798 debate to support its conclusion.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings .... ").

